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Abstract 
Pension funds are an important part of private savings flows, the main supplier of 
capital to industry and play a large and growing role in providing retirement incomes 
in countries with mature funded pension systems.  Reforms which increase the 
emphasis on privately managed, funded pensions must get the tax treatment right.  
This paper sets out the options for taxing pensions, and the arguments between them.  
The tax treatment in 35 different countries is described and summarized in an empirical 
measure: the marginal effective tax rate.  Other data assess the importance of pension 
funds and tax incentives in aggregate, drawing on national and international sources. 
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The tax treatment of funded pensions 
 
Edward Whitehouse1 
 
 
The tax treatment of pensions is a critical policy choice in the transition from a 
public sector, pay-as-you-go system to one in which all or part of pensions are 
provided through individual, privately managed pension accounts.  A generous 
tax treatment will promote pension saving but may be costly in terms of 
revenues forgone and encourage tax avoidance.  The distributional 
consequences may also be undesirable if higher income individuals are better 
able to take advantage of tax reliefs.   
 In countries with mature funded pension systems — such as the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States — 
pension funds are worth an average of 85 per cent of GDP. Private pensions 
account for a major part of private-sector savings flows, are an important 
supplier of capital to industry and play a large and growing role in providing 
retirement incomes.  These figures alone mean that it is vital to give the tax 
treatment of pensions careful consideration.    
 This paper is structured as follows.  The next section considers a number 
of different possible ways of taxing pensions.  Section 2 provides a descriptive 
overview of the tax treatment of pensions in a range of countries.  Section 3 
extends the analysis to compute a summary measure of the generosity of tax 
incentives, the marginal effective tax rate on pension saving.  Section 4 
considers the link between the taxation of pension funds and the tax treatment 
                                       
1 Director, Axia Economics, 38 Concanon Road, London, SW2 5TA; e-mail: 
edward.whitehouse@axiaecon.com; web: http://www.axiaecon.com.  Thanks are due to David 
Lindeman and Robert Palacios of the World Bank, Andrew Dilnot and Richard Disney of the 
Institute for Fiscal Studies in London, Willem Adema and Mark Pearson of the OECD in Paris 
and Paul Johnson of the Financial Services Authority in London for their help and advice.  The 
 5
of the underlying assets, particularly equities and bonds, in which they invest. 
 Section 5 examines the deductibility of contributions.  Sections 6 and 7 look at 
the importance of pension funds and associated tax incentives in aggregate.  
Section 8 assesses the objectives for taxing pensions, the options and the 
arguments while section 9 concludes. 
 
1. Possible pensions taxation régimes 
 Three transactions constitute the process of saving via a funded pension 
scheme, each of which provides an occasion at which taxation is possible:  
• when money is contributed to the fund, normally by employers and 
employees; 
• when investment income and capital gains accrue to the fund; and 
• when retired scheme members receive benefits.  
If pensions are pay-as-you-go financed (i.e., out of current contributions) then 
the second point at which taxation may occur is lost.   
 Given three points at which it is possible to levy tax, there are eight basic 
tax combinations.  There are examples of many of these in practice, but some are 
more common and characterise theoretical ideals for the tax system.   
 Table 1 illustrates four hypothetical régimes.2  The Table shows the net 
pension resulting from a contribution of 100 made five years before retirement. 
 A proportional tax of 25 per cent and a rate of return on investment of 10 per 
cent per annum are assumed.  The effect of inflation is ignored for the moment.  
 The first régime exempts contributions from tax, does not tax fund 
income, but does tax the pension in payment.  This can be termed an exempt, 
exempt, taxable (EET) system.  The second involves saving out of taxed income, 
no tax on the fund's investment return and tax-free withdrawal of pension 
                                                                                                                           
usual disclaimer applies, and the paper is a personal view.  
2 The table ignores extreme cases where pensions are taxed at all three possible points or at 
none of them, and where either investment returns alone are taxed or alone are exempt.  
These more unusual régimes are discussed below.   
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benefits, i.e., a TEE system.  In this simple framework with a flat tax rate, these 
two systems are equivalent in effect.  They both confer a post-tax rate of return 
to saving equal to the pre-tax rate of return.  They are neutral between 
consumption now and consumption in retirement.  Faced with either régime, 
an individual earning 100 now can consume now, paying 25 in tax and buying 
goods worth 75, or they can save, allowing consumption of 120.79 in five years. 
 But 120.79 is simply the amount available for consumption now, increased at 
a 10 per cent rate of compound interest, i.e. 75x(1.1)5.  This also means these 
régimes are equitable in their treatment of different individuals: people who 
save for future consumption pay the same tax as those who consume now.  
Finally, the two systems also deliver the same net present value of revenues to 
the government.  However, the timing is different: revenues are deferred until 
retirement under EET, but received immediately under TEE.   
 In practice, the EET and TEE systems may not have the same effect 
because of the point at which the tax exemption occurs.  If an individual pays a 
different marginal income tax rate while in work from the tax rate paid in 
retirement, then pre- and post-tax rates of return will no longer be equalised.  
The individual will benefit more from a régime granting tax relief when his or 
her marginal rate is higher.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.  Alternative pensions taxation régimes 
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 EET TEE TTE ETT 
Contribution 100 100 100 100 
Tax - 25 25 - 
Fund 100 75 75 100 
Net investment return 61.05 45.79 32.67 43.56 
Fund at retirement 161.05 120.79 107.67 143.56 
Tax on pension 40.26 - - 35.89 
Net pension 120.79 120.79 107.67 107.67 
Net present value of tax 25 33.14 25 33.14 
Note Assumes 10 per cent annual real return, 25 per cent tax rate and five-year investment term 
 
 The last two systems involve taxation at two points.  Under the third 
régime, savings are made out of taxed income, income earned by the fund is 
then taxed but benefits received are exempted (TTE).  The tax exemption in the 
last system occurs at the point of contribution, while fund income and benefits 
are taxable (ETT).  
 The effects of these two systems are the same in this simple model.  
However, the post-tax rate of return is now below the pre-tax rate (7.5 per cent 
rather than 10 per cent: 107.67 = 75x(1.075)5).  These two systems result in a 
disincentive to saving, because consumption now is worth more than 
consumption in the future.   
 The EET and TEE régimes are equivalent to the ‘expenditure tax’ of the 
public finance literature3, while the ETT and TTE systems correspond to a 
‘comprehensive income tax’.  The origin of these names is clear.  The first two 
régimes tax only consumption (or expenditure) and at the same rate whether 
consumption is undertaken now or in the future.  In contrast, the last two 
systems tax all accruals to income, whether from earnings or investments, 
irrespective of whether they are saved or consumed.   
 These two benchmark tax systems are different ways of interpreting 'fiscal 
neutrality' with respect to savings.  Equalising pre- and post-tax rates of return 
is neutral between present and future consumption.  A comprehensive income 
tax is neutral between consumption and saving, treating savings in exactly the 
same way as any other form of consumption.  However, savings are not a 
                                       
3 The EET system is the classical example of an expenditure tax.  The TEE system is often 
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commodity like any other good or service.  They are a means to future 
consumption, and this is particularly obvious where saving for retirement is 
concerned.  Neutrality between consumption now and consumption in 
retirement is the relevant concept for taxing pensions, and that is the form of 
neutrality achieved by the expenditure tax.4,5   
2. An international comparison of the tax treatment of pensions 
 Having examined the taxation of pensions in theory, this section 
compares pensions taxation in practice in a range of countries.6 
 Table 2 summarises the tax treatment of pensions in OECD countries at 
three stages identified in the previous section: when contributions are made, 
investment returns accrue and when the pension is paid out.7   
 The first column relates to the personal income tax treatment of 
contributions made out of earned income.  In most countries — exceptions 
include Australia, Iceland and Japan — contributions to a pension are made 
out of pre-tax income or attract a tax rebate.  The extent of this deductibility is 
limited in most countries.  
 The next three columns relate to the treatment of investment returns.  In 
most countries, income accruing in the pension fund accumulates tax-free, 
although Australia and Sweden apply a special tax rate (15 and 10 per cent 
respectively) to pension fund investment returns that is lower than marginal 
                                                                                                                           
called the ‘pre-paid expenditure tax’.   
4 On these issues, see Kaldor (1955), Carter Commission (1966), Meade Committee (1978),  
Pechman (1980), United States Treasury (1977, 1984), Andrews (1974) and IFS Capital Taxes 
Group (1995). 
5  Unfortunately, optimal tax theory gives little guidance on the appropriate tax treatment of 
savings.  The theory shows that the cross-elasticity of labour supply with respect to the 
interest rate is a central variable in an intertemporal model, but there is no empirical 
agreement on the magnitude of this variable.  The only firm conclusion is that neither a 
capital tax rate of zero (the expenditure tax) nor a capital tax rate equal to the tax on labour 
earnings (the comprehensive income tax) is optimal.   
6 See also Dilnot (1992, 1996a), Johnson (1993) and Whitehouse (1996) for international 
comparisons of pensions tax incentives.  
7  The Table refers to individual pension savings accounts.  Employer-based plans are 
significant in a number of countries and their tax treatment is usually similar to personal 
pensions.  Exceptions are Australia and Portugal —where employer contributions are fully 
deductible, but employee contributions only partially deductible — and Germany and the 
United States — where employer contributions are deductible but employee contributions are 
 9
income tax rates.  Denmark taxes only real investment returns, in line with the 
‘pure’ comprehensive income tax.   
 The final two columns of Table 2 cover taxation of the pension in 
payment.  The tax treatment of withdrawals from the fund, either as an 
annuity or a lump sum, varies considerably.  All countries bar New Zealand 
extract some tax at this point, although there are often tax concessions 
available.  Australia, Ireland, Japan and the United Kingdom, for example, 
allow withdrawal of a tax-free lump sum to be from the fund.  In most 
countries, withdrawals from the fund before retirement age are not permissible, 
although in some, such as Austria and the United States, this is possible 
subject to a tax penalty.   
 
                                                                                                                           
taxed.   
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Table 2.  Tax treatment of personal pension plans 
Country Contributions Pension fund Pension payment Notes 
 PIT PIT Other taxes PIT/CGT  
  Fund 
income 
Fund 
Income 
Fund 
value 
Pension
income 
Original 
value 
 
Australia T E T E T E 10% rebate on first A$1,000 (US$670) of 
contributions, phased out when income 
exceeds A$27,000; 15% tax on fund income; 
lump sums taxed at 16.25% over A$77,000; 
15% rebate on pension income; deductible 
contributions treated as fringe benefits 
Austria E E E E T T 50% of contributions deductible to ceiling; 
25% of annuity from individual's contributions 
taxable; 30% tax penalty on early withdrawal 
Belgium E E E T T T Limits on deductibility of contributions; 0.17% 
tax on assets of mutual providers (ASBL); 
tax credit on annuity; 10% tax on lump sums 
Canada E E E E T T Pension income credit at basic 17% rate on 
C$1,000 (US$780) of annuity income 
Denmark E E T E T T Real interest taxable 
Finland E E E E T T 60% of contributions deductible up to ceiling 
France T E E E T T — 
Germany E E E E T T Contributions deductible to ceiling, which 
may be exhausted by compulsory social 
security contributions 
Iceland T E E E T T — 
Ireland E E E E T T Limits on deductibility of contributions 
Japan T E E E T E Annuity income net of contributions taxable 
at standard rates; 50% of net lump sum over 
Y500,000 (US$4,000) taxable 
Luxembourg E E E E T T Limits on deductibility of contributions 
Netherlands E E E E T T Limits on deductibility of contributions 
New Zealand T E T E E E — 
Norway E E E E T T Limits on deductibility of contributions 
Portugal E E E E T T Limits on deductibility of contributions; 20% 
tax on lumps sums net of contributions 
Spain E E E E T T Limits on deductibility of contributions 
Sweden E E T E T T Limits on deductibility of contributions; 20% 
tax on fund income 
Switzerland E E E E T T Limits on deductibility of contributions 
United Kingdom E E E E T T Limits on deductibility of contributions 
United States E E E E T T Limits on deductibility of contributions; 10% 
tax penalty on withdrawals before age 59½ 
 
Source Derived from OECD (1994a), Table 4.4.  See OECD (1994b) for more detailed descriptions.      
Note PIT = personal income tax; CGT = capital gains tax; E = exempt from relevant tax; T = subject to tax. 
Personal pension plans only, not those provided by employers.  Data relate to January 1993. Personal 
pensions available in Italy since April 1993.  Greece and Turkey did not have personal pensions in January 
1993 
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Table 3 shows tax treatment in a range of countries, most of which have 
recently moved, or are proposing to move, towards a funded pension system.  
In the majority of Latin American countries, the tax treatment is of the 
traditional expenditure tax kind (EET).  The only exception is Peru, which has a 
pre-paid expenditure tax (TEE).  Hungary and Poland have both adopted the 
expenditure tax for their new mandatory pension funds.  Poland operates a 
pre-paid expenditure tax régime for voluntary pension contributions.  Hungary 
gives a much more generous treatment: exempting investment returns and 
pensions in payment as well as giving a tax credit on contributions which 
exceeds even the highest tax rate (see the box in the next section).  The Czech 
Republic taxes its voluntary funds in a similar way, matching contributions up 
to a limit.  
Table 3.  Tax treatment of personal pension plans 
 Contributions Returns Benefits Notes 
Latin America     
Argentina E E T  
Chile E E T  
Colombia E E T  
Costa Rica E E ?  
Mexico E E T  
Peru T E E  
Uruguay E E T  
     
Eastern Europe     
Czech Republic C E E  
Hungary E E T Mandatory, or ‘second-pillar’, contributions.  
Voluntary, ‘third-pillar’ contributions have tax credit 
to a limit (CEE)  
Poland E E T Second-pillar contributions.  Third pillar has pre-
paid expenditure tax treatment (TEE) 
     
Asia     
India E E T Employees’ contributions to voluntary personal 
pension plans.  Lump sums are tax free. 
Contributions to employees’ and exempt or 
approved provident funds attract a 20% credit 
Indonesia E T T Funds’ bank deposits and returns on listed local 
securities tax free; returns on open-ended mutual 
funds, unlisted securities and property taxed 
Korea E E E  
Philippines T T E Employees’ contributions.  Employers’ are ETE to 
tax qualified occupational pension plans and TTE to 
unqualified plans 
     Note:T=taxed, E=exempt, C=tax credit 
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 Tables 2 and 3 show that most countries’ systems for taxing pensions 
approximate to the expenditure tax treatment, that is allowing income tax 
deduction of contributions, exempting funds' investment returns and with tax 
due on pensions in payment.  Twenty-three of 35 countries shown broadly 
follow this pattern, although most of them have minor deviations from a pure 
expenditure tax.  It is also worth noting that these apparently generous 
schemes have typically been in place for lengthy periods.  Countries that have 
recently reformed their pensions tax system have tended to make them less 
generous.  For example, New Zealand has moved from EET to TTE, and 
Australia now extracts some tax at all three possible points.  In New Zealand, 
this has led to a dramatic reduction in pension saving.   
 In all countries, there are enormous differences between pensions 
taxation and the taxation of other forms of savings.  For example, housing is 
often offered a similar (e.g., Canada, United States) or even more generous (e.g., 
Germany, United Kingdom) treatment than pensions.  Direct investment in 
equities or bank deposits is taxed more heavily than housing or pensions 
almost everywhere.8  Individuals choose where to put their savings not on 
economic grounds, such as expected return and risk, but on fiscal grounds.   
Many countries have moved recently to reduce differences in tax 
treatment.9  Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden have implemented the 
most extensive reforms, moving towards a flat-rate tax on capital income. 
Finland, for example, has introduced a separate flat tax of 25 per cent on 
capital income and abolished tax-exempt savings deposits.  Norway taxes 
interest, imputed income from owner-occupation, dividends etc. at a flat 28 per 
cent.  In Portugal, the tax reform of 1989 introduced reliefs for retirement and 
housing savings accounts and stock option plans.  Other countries have 
introduced special savings-incentive schemes (often with expenditure-tax 
treatment).  Examples, which exempt the interest on deposits up to a ceiling, 
                                       
8  See OECD (1994a).   
9  See Whitehouse (1997).   
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include the plan d’épargne populaire (PEP) and Livret A accounts in France.  
Germany, the Netherlands and Spain simply exempt a fixed amount of interest 
income from all sources.  Schemes offering limited deduction for equity 
investments are available in Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, 
Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg and Norway.  In the United Kingdom, special 
schemes for tax-free deposits and equity investments have recently been 
merged into a new individual savings account (ISA).10   
 
3. Empirical analysis of pension saving incentives 
 The diversity of taxes, allowances and deductions shown in Tables 2 
and 3 gives little guidance to the incentive effects of the taxation of pensions.  
This section uses a simplified model of the saving decision to summarise the 
effect of different taxes.  The approach is adapted from the King and Fullerton 
(1984) method used to calculate investment incentives in the corporate 
sector.11  The model looks at a saver's incentives at the margin, that is a small 
additional investment in an asset already held, which generates returns just 
sufficient to make the saving worthwhile.  The analysis assumes a fixed pre-tax 
real rate of return of 5 per cent.  The fund is invested 40 per cent in bonds and 
60 per cent in equities, and dividends account for one third of the real return 
on equities, with two thirds from capital gains.  Two savers are considered: one 
paying the marginal tax rate applicable at the earnings level of the average 
production worker12 in the country concerned, the second at the highest rate of 
all relevant taxes.   
 Figures 1 and 2 show the marginal effective tax rate on pension saving in 
21 OECD countries in January 1993.  Figure 1 shows the marginal effective tax 
rate at average earnings and Figure 2 at the top rate of income tax applied to 
earnings.  The marginal effective tax rates under the two benchmark systems 
described above — the expenditure tax and the comprehensive income tax — 
                                       
10  See Inland Revenue (1997) and Banks, Dilnot and Tanner (1997).   
11 See Annex 2 of OECD (1994a) for a detailed description of the methodology as applied here; 
OECD (1991) and Scott (1987) provide a detailed discussion of the King-Fullerton approach.    
12 See OECD (1997) for a description.    
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are shown for comparison.  The effective tax rate under an expenditure tax 
would be zero, since the pre-tax return equals the post-tax return.  Under a 
comprehensive income tax, it would be the top income tax rate or the marginal 
rate on average earnings respectively.  The figures rank countries by the value 
of the marginal effective tax rate.   
 The Figures show the enormous range of tax treatments.  The most 
generous scheme offers a tax subsidy of 12 per cent at the tax rate levied on 
average earnings, rising to 26 per cent at top tax rates.  The least generous has 
a marginal effective tax rate of 73 per cent.   
 The countries can be divided into four main groups according to the 
generosity of their tax treatment.  First, a group that grants pensions a more 
generous treatment than the expenditure-tax benchmark: Australia, Austria, 
Ireland, Portugal and the United Kingdom.  Secondly, Canada, Germany, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and the United States, who apply an 
expenditure-tax treatment to pensions.  Thirdly, another six countries — 
Denmark, France, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland — where the 
system’s generosity lies between the two benchmarks.  Fourthly, the system in 
Belgium, Iceland, Japan and New Zealand is even less generous than a pure 
comprehensive income tax.    
 The exact value of the marginal effective tax rate is often very sensitive to 
the assumptions used.  In particular, no account has been taken of the fact 
that a pensioner may often pay income tax at a lower rate than when working.. 
This is due both to the progressivity of the tax system (incomes in retirement 
are generally lower) and due to special tax treatment of pensioners.13  Eleven 
OECD countries — Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Ireland, Japan, 
Norway, Portugal, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States — have 
such concessions.  For example,  
• Canada grants an extra age tax credit of C$3,482, withdrawn above a 
ceiling; 
                                       
13 See OECD (1990) and Disney and Whitehouse (1999), section 6 and Kalisch and Aman (1998),  Table 7.   
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• single pensioners in Ireland receive an extra age allowance of IR£400, with 
IR£800 for couples; 
• a range of deductions in Japan mean the vast majority of pensioners pay no 
income tax; 
 
• tax allowances in the United Kingdom are worth between 29 and 34 per cent 
more (depending on age) for single pensioners than for people of working 
age, and 39-43 per cent more for married couples; the extra allowance is 
withdrawn above a ceiling; and  
• the United States offers an extra $1,000 deduction for single pensioners, 
and an $1,800 for married couples 
Taking account of these concessions would be complex.  But the effect 
would obviously be to reduce the effective tax rate below the levels shown in 
Figure 1 and 2.  
 16
Figure 1.  Marginal effective tax rates on pension saving 
Tax rate at average production worker earnings level 
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Figure 2.  Marginal effective tax rates on pension saving 
at top rate of tax 
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Note Calculated at OECD average inflation rate of 3.7 per cent in January 1993.   
Source OECD (1994a), Tables 5.4, 5.5 and A2.2.   
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 A second difficulty is the sensitivity of the tax burden to the level of 
inflation.  A pure comprehensive income tax would only tax real returns, but 
countries which tax investment returns tend to tax nominal returns, meaning 
that the real tax burden is sensitive to the level of inflation.  The marginal-
effective-tax-rate calculations in Figures 1 and 2 assumed inflation at the 
OECD average in January 1993 of 3.7 per cent.  Figure 3 looks at the 
sensitivity of taxes to inflation, by comparing the earlier results with tax 
liabilities under zero inflation, keeping the real return fixed at 5 per cent.  The 
nominal return is 8.9 per cent in the OECD average inflation case, and 5 per 
cent in the zero inflation case.   
 
Figure 3.  Marginal effective tax rates on pension saving 
at OECD average and zero inflation 
marginal effective tax rate (%)
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Source OECD (1994a), Tables 5.4 and 5.6 
 
 Given the prevalence of expenditure tax or near expenditure tax 
treatments, the marginal effective tax rate is insensitive to inflation in 13 
countries.  Sensitivity to inflation in the other eight countries occurs for a 
 18
variety of reasons.  Australia, New Zealand and Sweden tax nominal returns as 
they accrue, so the tax rate rises with inflation.  Japan and Portugal effectively 
tax the nominal return by taxing withdrawal of pension net of the amount 
contributed.  In Belgium, the value of the pension fund may be taxed, and in 
Belgium, Denmark and Finland inflation-sensitivity arises from the taxation of 
the original value of the asset.   
 Figure 3 shows that even at low levels, inflation can have big effects on 
the net returns to pension savings.  The move from zero to 3.7 per cent can 
increase the marginal effective tax rate by over 20 percentage points.  Inflation 
can also have significant distortionary effects on the investments pension funds 
make, and it is to the tax treatment of pension funds' assets which we now 
turn.   
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Box.  Tax treatment of pensions in Hungary, 1996 
 
The table runs through the tax treatment for two categories of taxpayer: one paying the 
lowest rate of 20 per cent and the other, the highest rate of 48 per cent.  The table 
assumes an investment of Ft100, earning a return of 10 per cent a year over five years.   
 The 50 per cent tax credit means that the fund receives more than Ft100, even for 
a higher-rate taxpayer.  With no tax on the fund earnings or withdrawal, the rate of return 
on savings exceeds 20 per cent, more than double the pre-tax rate of return.  The 
generosity exceeds that of an EEE treatment.  In contrast, EET or TEE would give a post-
tax rate of return of 10 per cent, and ETT or TTE would give 5-8 per cent, depending on 
the taxpayer (compare the results here with Table 1). 
 
Table 4.  Tax treatment of pensions in Hungary 
 Ft 20% tax 48% tax  
 Earnings 100 100  
 Tax -20 -48  
 Tax credit 50 50  
 Fund 130 102  
 Fund returns 79.37 62.27  
 Withdrawal 209.37 164.27  
 Rate of return (%) 21.2 25.9  
 
 The effect is still more pronounced if account is taken of reduced social-security 
contributions.  For every Ft100 switched from current earnings to pension, the 
government loses Ft42.5 in employer contributions, Ft10 in employee contributions, on 
top of the Ft50 tax credit.  So, the total loss to government is Ft102.5 for every Ft100 
deferred from current pay to pension.   
 
(Adapted from Dilnot, 1996b) 
 
4. Pension fund taxation and company taxation 
 Many discussions of pension fund taxation ignore the tax treatment of 
the underlying assets in which pension funds invest.  Table 5 illustrates the 
issue with a highly simplified example based on the tax system in the United 
Kingdom before the July 1997 budget.14  A company earns profits of 100 before 
tax and debt interest (initially of 20), and pays out half of net profits as 
dividends.  The corporation tax rate is assumed to be 31 per cent of profits 
                                       
14 This example is drawn from preliminary work by Booth and Cooper (1999).  
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after interest has been deducted.15  In the first three columns, this leaves a net 
profit of 55.2, of which half (27.6) is distributed.   
 Under the system before March 1993, shown in the first column, the tax 
rate on dividends was 25 per cent.  However, pension funds, exempted from 
tax, could obtain a 25 per cent credit against the tax paid at the company level, 
which would be 0.25x27.6/0.75, or 9.2.  So net tax receipts under this régime, 
known as ‘partial imputation’, were 15.6.   
Table 5.  Tax treatment of pension fund investment in a simple example company 
 25 per cent credit 
(before 1993) 
20 per cent credit 
(1993-1997) 
No credit 
(1997-) 
Switch to  
debt finance 
Gross profits before interest 100 100 100 100 
Debt interest 20 20 20 40 
Gross profits after interest 80 80 80 60 
Tax at 31% 24.8 24.8 24.8 18.6 
Net profit 55.2 55.2 55.2 41.5 
Dividend 27.6 27.6 27.6 13.9 
Retained profits 27.6 27.6 27.6 27.6 
Tax credit 9.2 6.9 0 0 
Net tax paid 15.6 17.9 24.8 18.6 
 
 The March 1993 budget cut the basic rate of tax on dividends to 20 per 
cent.  But at the same time, the tax credit was cut to 20 per cent.  Despite the 
apparent cut in tax, the effect was to raise tax on pension funds' investments 
as the tax credit falls to 0.2x27.6/0.8 or 6.9.  Net tax receipts increase from 
15.6 to 17.9, or 14 per cent.   
 Assuming 50 per cent of profits were paid as dividends, the effective tax 
rate on domestic equity investment was 0.5x0.31 + 0.5x(0.31-0.2), or 21 per 
cent.  Domestic equities comprise 52 per cent of pension funds' portfolios, with 
overseas equities making up a further 23 per cent.  Assuming that other 
countries' corporate income tax rate is also 31 per cent, then the effective tax 
rate on pension funds under this system would be 0.52x0.21 + 0.23x0.31, or 
18.1 per cent.   
                                       
15 The actual rate was 33 per cent from 1991 until July 1997, 31 per cent from  then until 
March 1999 and is currently 30 per cent.   
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 The tax credit for equities owned by companies and pension funds was 
abolished in the 1997 budget by the incoming New Labour government.  The 
system is now classified as one of ‘partial shareholder relief’ (OECD, 1991).  So 
although pensions funds remain exempt from tax on their dividends, there is 
no longer any allowance made for taxes paid at the company level.  The net tax 
revenues in this simple example are now 24.8 (31% of 80).  This increases the 
effective tax rate on domestic equities from 21 to 31 per cent.  The overall 
effective tax rate on pension funds, with a total of 76 per cent invested in 
equities, is therefore 0.76x0.31, or 23.6 per cent.  As this is a little higher than 
the standard rate of income tax (23 per cent), the true tax régime for standard-
rate taxpayers is ETT rather than EET.   
 One likely impact of this reform is to encourage companies to switch 
from equity to debt finance, either from loans or bond issues.  The effect of this 
is illustrated in the final column of Table 5, which shows what would happen if 
the company doubled their debt but kept their retained earnings constant.  
Debt interest payments increase from 20 to 40 and retained profits remain 
27.6, leaving 13.9 for the dividend.  However, net tax receipts fall to 18.6, and 
so the net return to pension fund investors (as bond and shareholders) 
increases.  There is already evidence of companies organising their finances to 
reduce their tax payments in this way.   
 
5. Distributional issues and restrictions on pension contributions 
 Table 2 shows that most countries restrict the extent to which pension 
contributions can be deducted from the personal income tax.  This is normally 
to circumscribe tax avoidance or because of distributional concerns.  Higher-
income individuals are better able to make pension contributions, and receive a 
larger tax advantage because of the deductibility of contributions against 
higher rates of income tax.   
 Limits on deductibility can take a number of forms: 
• absolute limits on the amount of contributions (e.g. Australia, Germany) 
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• limits on the proportion of contributions that can be deducted (e.g. Austria, 
Finland) 
• limits on the proportion of income on which contributions can be made (e.g. 
United Kingdom) 
• limits on the deductibility of contributions at higher rates of income tax 
Table 6 investigates the last of these further using the simple framework of 
Table 1.  The first four columns look at an individual who pays a higher tax 
rate, assumed to be 40 per cent, during both their working life and retirement. 
 The first column shows the standard expenditure-tax treatment.  Since 
contributions are deductible at the higher rate, the result up to retirement is 
the same as for the standard rate taxpayer in Table 1.  After retirement, 
however, 40 per cent tax is payable, so the net pension is just 96.63.  Again, 
the tax is neutral over the timing of consumption: the individual can consume 
60 now or 96.63 = 60x(1.1)5.  Again, the classical expenditure tax has the same 
effect as the pre-paid expenditure tax, shown in the second column.   
 The deductibility of pension contributions is restricted to the standard 
rate of tax — assumed to be 25 per cent — in the third column.  Partial 
deductibility means the gross contribution of 100 is reduced by 15 (the 
difference between the higher and standard rates).  The result is a lower 
pension — 82.14 or 15 per cent lower — than the unrestricted expenditure tax. 
 However, although the pension is 14 lower, the net present value of tax 
receipts is only nine higher.  The partial taxation of contributions means there 
is less to tax when the pension is paid.   
 The fourth column shows a comprehensive income tax at a 40 per cent 
rate.  This shows that restricting the deductibility of contributions is close to 
introducing a comprehensive income tax.  Moreover, the arguments for and 
against this treatment can also be applied to the argument that contributions 
should not be deductible at higher rates of income tax.   
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Table 6.  Alternative tax treatments for higher-rate taxpayers 
 Higher rate in work and retirement  Higher rate in work, basic rate in retirement 
 EET TEE with limit ETT EET TEE with limit ETT
Contribution 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Tax 0 40 15 0 0 40 15 0
Fund 100 60 85 100 100 60 85 100
Net investment return 61.05 36.63 51.89 43.56 61.05 36.63 51.89 43.56
Fund at retirement 161.05 96.63 136.89 133.82 161.05 96.63 136.89 133.82
Tax on pension 64.42 0 54.76 53.53 40.26 0 34.22 33.46
Net pension 96.63 96.63 82.14 80.29 120.79 96.63 102.67 100.37
Net present value of tax 40 40 49 50.14 25 40 36.25 37.68
 
 The final four columns show a similar analysis for a person who pays the 
higher rate of tax when contributions are paid and investment returns accrue, 
but pays the standard rate of tax during retirement.  Column five shows that 
the classical expenditure-tax treatment delivers the same pension and tax 
receipts as for people who pay the standard rate of tax during their working life 
(compare Table 1).  But the pre-paid expenditure tax raises more revenue than 
the classical tax from people who are higher-rate taxpayers when working and 
standard-rate taxpayers when they draw their pension.   
 Again, restricting the deductibility of contributions to the basic rate 
(column seven) reduces the pension compared with unrestricted deductibility.  
It also raises the tax take, but the initial gain from restricted deductibility is 
offset by the loss from the lower revenues on the lower pension.  The net effect 
is again close to the comprehensive income tax (column eight).   
 
6. An international comparison of pension funds 
 Table 7 gives an indication of the scale of pension funds in a selection of 
OECD countries.  In eight of them — Canada, Finland, Ireland, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States — 
pension funds’ assets exceeded 40 per cent of GDP in 1996.  In seven others — 
Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Korea and Spain — 
pension fund assets are much smaller, less than 5 per cent of GDP.  These 
differences reflect varied levels of private pension provision and differences in 
pension financing.  In the countries with the largest pension fund sectors, 
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coverage of employees in employer-provided pension plans varies between 50 
per cent in the United Kingdom and 90 per cent in Switzerland.16  In Belgium, 
for example, coverage is less than 5 per cent, whereas in France, although 
coverage is broad, most schemes are pay-as-you-go.   
 
Table 7.  Pension-fund assets as a percentage of GDP, 1987-96 
Country 1987 1990 1993 1996 
Switzerland 75 73 82 117 
Netherlands 46 78 84 87 
United Kingdom 62 60 72 75 
United States 36 38 53 58 
Ireland — 32 40 45 
Canada 26 30 36 43 
Japan 38 37 41 42 
Finland 20 25 38 41 
Sweden 33 31 27 33 
Australia — 18 30 31 
Denmark 11 12 19 24 
Luxembourg 20 20 18 20 
Greece — 7 8 13 
Portugal — 2 6 10 
Norway 4 5 6 7 
Germany 3 3 6 6 
France — 3 3 6 
Belgium 2 3 3 4 
Spain — 2 2 4 
Korea 3 3 3 3 
Italy — — 2 3 
Austria — — 1 1 
Czech Republic — — — 1 
Hungary — — — 0 
Source OECD (1998a), Table V.1 
Note Figures for Denmark include company pension funds only in 1996 and for Germany for 1993 and 
1996 only.  Figures for Finland cover financial assets only.  First pillar assets are included in Sweden 
for 1987 and 1990.   
 In the eight countries with the largest pension funds, there has been 
rapid growth in their assets: by an average of 56 per cent over the nine-year 
period.  This growth reflects the maturing of private pension schemes in many 
countries.  In the United Kingdom, for example, private sector pension funds 
had five contributors for every pensioner in 1970, falling to fewer than two in 
                                       
16 OECD (1992).   
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1991.17  Pension funds also grew because of high real rates of return.  In 
Ireland, these were 11 per cent a year between 1984 and 1996, 8 per cent in 
the Netherlands, 4 per cent in Switzerland, 10 per cent in the United Kingdom 
and 9 per cent in the United States.18   
 In many of these countries, pension funds are an important source of 
capital.  They own a third of equities in the United Kingdom and United 
States.19  In the Netherlands and the United States, pension funds own around 
40 per cent of corporate bonds.  Ownership of financial assets is also 
concentrated in some countries which have introduced funded pension 
systems more recently.  For example, Chilean funds account for 43 per cent of 
stock-market capitalisation, and Argentine funds for 15 per cent.   
 Table 8 shows pension fund assets in a range of Latin American 
countries that have recently introduced funded defined-contribution pension 
systems.  Chile, which reformed its system in 1981, now has $33bn in its 
pension funds, or 44 per cent of GDP.  Of the others, Argentina, which 
reformed its system in 1994, has the largest funds at $9bn, almost 3 per cent 
of GDP.  However, growth in Argentina has been slower than in Chile, where 
funds exceeded 8 per cent of GDP three years after reform.   
 
Table 8.  Pension fund assets as a percentage of GDP, 
December 1997 
Country Assets, % of GDP 
Chile 44.1 
Argentina 2.8 
Peru  2.1 
Colombia 1.3 
Uruguay 1.0 
Mexico 0.2 
Source Queisser (1998) based on Uruguay, Central Bank (1997), Comision Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro 
para el Retiro (1997), Primamerica (1997) and Superintendencia de Administrado de Fondos de 
Jublicaciones y Pensiones (1997) 
 
                                       
17 Appendix 5.1 of Dilnot et al.  (1994).   
18  OECD (1998a), Table V.3.   
19 OECD (1998a) and Davis (1995).  See also Brancato (1994) on the United States and Hoffman 
and Lambert (1993) on the United Kingdom.   
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 There is some correlation between tax treatment and the size of pension 
funds, but a number of exceptions.  Austria and Portugal give among the most 
generous tax privileges to pensions, but have relatively small funds.  In 
Austria's case, this probably reflects the size of the public pension system 
(Table 9).  This is also likely to apply to Germany and Spain, where pension 
funds are relatively small despite the expenditure tax treatment.20  At the other 
end of the spectrum, Finland and Japan have large pension funds but tax 
private pensions closer to the comprehensive income tax than the expenditure 
tax.  A generous tax treatment seems neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for large private pension funds.  The regulatory and industrial 
relations régimes, historical factors as well as the public pension system will 
also affect the size of private funds.  
 
                                       
20 The book reserve financing system in Germany also complicates the analysis.   
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Table 9.  Public pensions in OECD member countries 
Percentage of GDP 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Italy 9.1 11.3 12.0 13.6 
Austria 11.7 12.6 12.5 13.4 
France 9.8 10.9 11.1 12.2 
Greece  6.1 9.8 10.5 — 
Germany 10.8 10.8 10.1 10.9 
Luxembourg 10.8 10.1 9.7 10.4 
Belgium 9.4 10.0 9.4 10.3 
Spain 6.5 7.9 8.1 9.2 
Finland 5.7 7.6 7.5 9.1 
Sweden 6.8 7.4 7.5 8.2 
Denmark 6.1 6.0 6.6 7.8 
Netherlands 8.0 7.9 8.8 7.8 
Portugal 4.2 4.6 5.4 7.7 
OECD mean 6.6 7.0 6.9 7.5 
United Kingdom 6.8 7.1 7.1 7.3 
Switzerland 6.1 6.3 6.0 7.1 
Czech Republic — — 6.1 6.4 
Japan 4.0 4.8 5.0 6.3 
United States 6.1 6.2 6.0 6.3 
Norway 5.1 5.2 6.3 6.2 
New Zealand 6.9 7.5 7.6 5.8 
Canada 3.0 3.8 4.3 4.8 
Iceland — — — 4.2 
Turkey 1.7 1.8 3.2 3.7 
Ireland 4.3 4.5 4.0 3.5 
Australia 3.9 3.7 3.4 3.4 
Korea — — 0.8 1.4 
Mexico — 0.3 0.3 0.4 
Source Preliminary data from OECD (1998b) 
Note OECD mean calculated using only countries for which all for years of data are available 
 
 There is a reasonable negative correlation between the size of public and 
private pension systems.  Italy and Austria, for example, with the largest public 
pension expenditures, have among the smallest private pension funds.  But 
countries with the smallest public pension systems, with the exceptions of 
Australia and Ireland, also tend to have small private pension funds.  This is 
probably because the five lowest-spending countries — Australia, Ireland, 
Korea, Mexico, Turkey — also have the lowest aged dependency ratio of the 
OECD countries.   
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Table 10.  Public pensions as a percentage of  
total pensioner income 
Country Per cent 
Germany 78 
Australia 77 
Sweden 75 
France 68 
Netherlands 66 
United Kingdom 62 
Italy 61 
Japan 52 
United States 46 
Source  Börsch-Supan (1998). 
 
 
 Private pensions perform an important and growing role in providing 
incomes in old age as well as a sizeable asset base in many of these countries.  
Table 10 shows the proportion of pensioners' incomes derived from public 
pensions in a selection of OECD countries.  Private income sources range from 
over half in the United States to a little over a fifth in Germany.  In many 
countries, the importance of private sources has been growing.  In the United 
Kingdom, for example, private income sources were under 40 per cent of total 
incomes in 1979, rising recently to more than half.  This trend is likely to 
continue: among recently retired pensioners (in the first five years over state 
pension age), private income sources are 60 per cent of the total.21   
 
7. Measuring the revenue cost of pensions taxation incentives 
 The concept of a ‘tax expenditure’ was developed in recognition of the fact 
the tax system can be used to achieve similar goals to public spending 
programmes, but accounting for the costs and benefits of tax measures is often 
less rigorous and regular than for direct expenditure.  A tax expenditure is said 
to exist when the tax system deviates from some benchmark tax system.  In 
general, this norm includes the tax rate structure, accounting conventions, 
administrative provisions and provisions relating to international fiscal 
                                       
21 Department of Social Security (1994, 1997).  See Whitehouse (1998) for a discussion.   
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obligations.  Defining a tax expenditure in practice can be difficult: some tax 
measures may not be readily classified as part of the benchmark or an 
exception to it.22  Tax expenditures are usually calculated using the so-called 
‘revenue forgone’ method, which computes the tax that would have been 
payable ceteris paribus if the tax concession were removed, and economic 
behaviour remained unchanged.  Fourteen OECD countries now produce tax-
expenditure reports.   
 With three occasions at which they might be taxed, pensions offer a 
broad range of possible benchmarks, a subset of which were presented in Table 
1.  Countries' methods of calculating tax expenditures for pensions differ, and 
a number of countries (including Belgium, Canada and the United Kingdom) 
have recently changed their methods of reporting tax expenditures for 
pensions.  In Australia, Canada, Spain and the United States, the 
comprehensive income tax — with pension benefits tax-free and contributions 
and investment returns taxed — is used as the benchmark.  Usually, however, 
there is no inflation adjustment, so nominal rather than real returns are taxed. 
 In the United Kingdom, the actual tax treatment is compared with a so-called 
‘unapproved’ scheme, where contributions and investment returns are taxed 
but the withdrawal of the pension as a lump sum is tax-free.  This is equivalent 
to the comprehensive income tax treatment (i.e., TTE).  Other countries (such 
as the Netherlands) do not report tax expenditures for pensions at all, or (for 
example, Germany) choose a benchmark very much closer to the actual 
system.   
 The results are highly sensitive to the choice of benchmark.  The 
difference in the results between measuring the cost against the comprehensive 
income tax and the expenditure tax can be seen from the relative positions of 
the two lines in Figures 1 and 2.  The baseline against which the actual 
treatment is compared is between 25 and 50 per cent higher (depending on the 
country's tax system) in the comprehensive income tax case.  Dilnot and 
Johnson (1993a,b) argue that, since an expenditure tax is the most appropriate 
                                       
22 See OECD (1984, 1995) and Surrey (1975) for a detailed discussion.   
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tax treatment for pensions, tax expenditures should be calculated against this 
norm.  A second argument for using an expenditure tax as benchmark is that 
in response to the abolition of pension tax incentives, savings would flow to 
similarly fiscally privileged assets.  Taking account of behavioural responses, 
the extra revenue raised from abolishing pensions tax incentives would be 
small.  Dilnot and Johnson found that the United Kingdom tax expenditure on 
pensions was just £1bn when measured in this way, compared with around 
£7bn reported in official figures at the time of their study.   
 Table 11 shows tax expenditures relating to pensions reported by OECD 
governments in national currencies and as a percentage of total tax receipts.  
Compared with a comprehensive income tax base, over 3 per cent of income tax 
revenues are forgone in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United 
States.  In Canada and the United Kingdom, pensions are the largest item in 
tax expenditure accounts; in the United States, they are the second largest, 
after health insurance.  These tax expenditures are also large when compared 
with direct public spending.  In the United Kingdom, for example, the total 
reported in the tax expenditure accounts for 1996-97 was over £10bn 
compared with £30bn spent on state pensions.   
 However, because of the use of different benchmarks in computing 
revenues forgone, many of these figures are not strictly comparable between 
countries.  Nor, because of behavioural responses, are they an accurate 
indication of the revenues that the removal of tax reliefs for pensions would 
raise.   
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Table 11.  Revenue cost of pensions tax incentives 
Country Tax expenditure Year Amount % of total 
tax revenue 
Australia Concessional treatment of superannuation contributions, 
fund income and benefits paid 
1992-93 A$5.3bn 4.6 
Belgium Private pension savings 1989 BF 8.9bn 0.3 
 Employer pension schemes (`Assurance-Groupes') 1988 BF 3.7bn 0.1 
Canada Registered retirement saving plans 1989 C$3.23bn 2.5 
 Registered pension plans 1989 C$7.7bn 5.9 
Finland Tax exemption of national pension supplements, etc. 1991 FMk 0.7bn 0.3 
 Pension income deduction in municipal taxation 1991 FMk 3.1bn 1.5 
Germany Flat rate tax of 15% on taxable employer contributions to 
company pension schemes 
1991 DM 1.7bn 0.2 
Ireland Employees' contributions to approved superannuation 
schemes 
1990 IR£53m 0.5 
 Exemption of the income of approved superannuation 
funds 
1990 IR£200m 2.0 
 Retirement annuity premiums of the 
self-employed 
1990-91 IR£23m 0.2 
Portugal Retirement savings schemes 1992 Esc 2.8bn 0.1 
Spain Tax incentives for pension funds 1993 Ptas 16bn 0.1  
Sweden Pension funds 1992 SKr 9.7bn 1.3  
United Kingdom Occupational pensions - income tax relief 1996-97 £8.0bn 3.0 
 
 
Contributions to personal pensions – income tax relief 
(including retirement annuity premiums and 'free-standing 
additional voluntary contributions') 
1996-97 £2.2bn 0.8  
United States Employer plans 1991 $48bn 3.0 
 IRAs 1991 $6.9bn 0.4 
 Keogh plans 1991 $1.6bn 0.1 
Note Figures are not comparable between countries 
Source OECD (1994a, 1995), Australia, Department of the Treasury (1994), Belgium, Chambre des 
Représentants (1992), Canada, Department of Finance (1993), United Kingdom, HM Treasury 
(1997), United States, Joint Committee on Taxation (1993) and Treasury (1994) 
 
8.  Objectives for the tax system 
 The first section of the paper argued that the expenditure tax was the 
most appropriate treatment for pension savings because it is neutral in the 
allocation of consumption between the working life and retirement.  There are 
further reasons, including ones of equity and simplicity, for thinking that an 
expenditure tax might offer the best way of taxing pensions.   
 First, identifying investment returns, especially those in the form of 
unrealised capital gains, can be difficult.  Taxing gains on realisation rather 
than as they are accrued causes different problems.23   
                                       
23  Defined-benefit plans (where the value of the pension benefit is related to some measure of 
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 Secondly, as the marginal effective tax rates in Figure 3 showed, the 
comprehensive income tax has difficulty dealing with inflation.  Taxing 
investment returns often means that nominal returns are taxed, meaning the 
post-tax real return falls still further below the pre-tax real return.  If, for 
example, the real interest rate were 2.5 per cent, and inflation 7.5 per cent, 
then the TTE and ETT systems without inflation adjustment would result in the 
net pension showing no real return.  The 7.5 per cent post-tax nominal return 
is only just enough to compensate for inflation.  A higher level of inflation 
would deliver negative real returns.  Many OECD countries do tax certain 
assets this way, such as ordinary interest-bearing deposits.24  By contrast, the 
expenditure tax, by avoiding taxing investment returns, maintains equal pre- 
and post-tax real returns whatever the mix of inflation and real returns in the 
nominal interest rate.   
 However, a comprehensive income tax raises more revenue at a given tax 
rate: the discounted total tax take is 25 under the expenditure tax and 33 
under the comprehensive income tax in the example given in Table 1.  The 
broader tax base of comprehensive income allows a lower tax rate to collect the 
same revenues. A 20.5 per cent rate in the simple model would raise the same 
revenues as an expenditure tax with a 25 per cent rate.  This could have 
important economic effects through labour-supply incentives and the incentive 
to work in the ‘black’ or ‘shadow’ economy.25  But it still means savings choices 
are distorted.  An individual could choose to consume 79.5 now or save for 
retirement and consume 116.5 then.  But that is equivalent to just 72.3 at 
                                                                                                                           
earnings and years of scheme membership) raise further administrative difficulties.  At any 
point during scheme membership, the value of the pension depends on two future, uncertain 
variables — the total duration of membership and future earnings — and so the value of fund 
and investment returns cannot be allocated to individuals.  When marginal income tax rates 
vary (as in any progressive tax system), it is not possible to find the appropriate tax rate to 
apply to the pension fund, unless some arbitrary rate is used.  This also applies to 
contributions to the fund: in a defined benefit plan, these bear no relation to the pension 
benefit being accrued, and employer contributions are typically made as some percentage of 
the aggregate payroll (Disney and Whitehouse, 1994, 1996).  
24 See OECD (1994), Table 4.1.   
25 However, dynamic models of the economy suggest that wage earners benefit from the lower 
taxation of capital under an expenditure tax.  The economy’s capital stock is higher, 
increasing productivity and wages.   
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working age (or, equivalently, the neutral consumption in retirement would be 
128).   
 An expenditure tax may also affect portfolio choice.  Since pensions are 
taxed on withdrawal under the classical expenditure tax (EET), the government 
becomes a co-investor, sharing in any rents, but also participating in any 
losses.  This may encourage a riskier choice of portfolio.26   
 A second concept of fiscal neutrality with respect to savings decisions is 
neutrality between different types of savings instruments.27  If one savings 
medium is taxed more lightly than others are, then it will tend to attract funds 
at their expense.  Economic inefficiency results as decisions are distorted 
compared with those that would be made in a tax-free environment.  In many 
countries, saving for retirement is treated favourably compared with other 
savings media.  A number of arguments have been proposed to support this 
relatively generous treatment: 
• the state should ensure that people maintain a standard of living in 
retirement approaching the level when they were of working age;  
• by encouraging individual provision for retirement, the cost of social 
security benefits may be reduced, particularly when means-tested benefits 
are an important source of retirement income; and 
• the state should increase long-term savings to add to the level and/or 
stability of capital available for investment.   
 
 The first argument is a paternalist one; the state gives incentives to save 
for retirement (relative both to current and to future, pre-retirement 
consumption) because in the absence of incentives, individuals will fail to make 
                                       
26  Of course, this may be corrective if investors suffer from myopic risk or loss aversion.   
27  Hamilton and Whalley (1985) find that this type of neutrality is extremely important.  They 
find that both a comprehensive income tax and expenditure tax which treat all savings 
equally dominate a hybrid system with an expenditure tax treatment for housing and a 
comprehensive income tax treatment for everything else.  The reduced price distortion 
between assets dominates the effect of reduced distortion of intertemporal choice.  See also 
Hamilton (1987). 
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‘sufficient' provision.28 There are a number of reasons why, first this rationale 
may not be valid and, secondly, why the tax system is not a good way of 
achieving it.  It is hard to define ‘sufficiency’ of retirement income beyond an 
adequate minimum.  Offering tax incentives for retirement saving may not 
ensure that everyone achieves a minimum standard; some will still fail to 
provide whereas others may even over-provide.29  Other means of ensuring that 
retirement living standards approach the level during working life may be more 
effective and, perhaps, less distortionary: for example, the state can adjust the 
level of compulsory private pension contributions (the ‘second pillar’).   
 The second argument is one of ‘moral hazard’ — individuals will not 
provide for themselves if they know the state will give them an adequate income 
anyway.  Pensions are partly — e.g. in the United Kingdom — or wholly — e.g. 
in Australia — means-tested in a number of countries.  This means-testing 
produces a substantial disincentive to save for retirement, especially for people 
with low incomes.  Again, however, it does not follow that attaching fiscal 
privileges to pensions is an effective way of minimising the cost to the state, 
compared, for example, with mandating a certain level of contributions.  The 
reduction in current revenues that results from the tax incentive adds to this 
argument.   
 Tax incentives for pensions appear to increase pension savings.  
Examples include the ‘success’ of registered retirement savings plans, RRSPs, 
in Canada, personal pensions in the United Kingdom, and individual 
retirement accounts, IRAs, in the United States.30  Whether this results, 
however, from a substitution of pensions for other savings media or from an 
increase in overall savings is difficult to ascertain.  If people have a fixed target 
for retirement savings, a new tax incentive for pensions could induce them to 
reduce current savings, since their level of retirement income would remain the 
                                       
28 Diamond (1977) and Samuelson (1987).  
29  Other individuals may be ‘over-annuitised’, i.e. hold more of their wealth in the form of 
annuities (which cannot be bequeathed) than they would wish in the absence of tax 
privileges. 
30 See Carroll and Summers (1987) on RRSPs, Disney and Whitehouse (1992a,b) on personal 
pensions, and Venti and Wise (1986, 1987) and Gravelle (1989, 1991) on IRAs.   
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same.  Tax incentives cost the government by reducing revenues, cutting public 
sector saving.  Even if household savings increase, the overall effect on national 
saving is uncertain.   
 The empirical evidence on the effect of tax incentives on savings is 
inconclusive.  Alan Blinder commented,  
‘...there is zero evidence that tax incentives that enhance the rate of 
return on saving actually boost the national saving rate.  None.  No 
evidence.  Economists now accept that as a consensus view’.31   
Many empirical studies of household saving, particularly of IRAs in the United 
States, have found a positive effect32, although others are sceptical.33  The 
OECD (1994a) study of taxation and savings concludes its survey of evidence 
in a number of countries,  
‘There is no clear evidence that the level of taxation, along with other 
factors affecting the rate of return, does generally affect the level of 
saving’.34   
Given the inconclusive nature of this literature, it does not seem wise to 
suggest that a desire to increase economy-wide saving either is or should be a 
major objective for the taxation of pensions.  Changing the composition of 
saving towards long-term retirement savings might at times, however, be a 
useful policy tool.   
 Having established the desirability of expenditure tax treatment for 
pensions and of a ‘level playing field’ for different types of saving, the final 
policy choice is between the classical expenditure tax (EET) and the pre-paid 
expenditure tax (TEE). 
 The pre-paid expenditure tax has much to recommend it.  First, by 
bringing the revenues from pension taxation forward compared with the 
                                       
31 Interview in Challenge, September-October 1992 quoted by Gylfason (1993).  
32 See, for example, Hubbard (1984), Venti and Wise (1987), Feenberg and Skinner (1989) and 
Poterba, Venti and Wise (1996).   
33 For example, Gravelle (1989, 1991), Munnell (1986) and Engen, Gale and Scholz (1994).   
34 OECD (1994a), p. 189.  See also Robson (1995) and Boadway and Wilasdin (1994) for a 
discussion. 
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deferred taxation in the classical expenditure tax, it alleviates the transitional 
pension deficit when moving from a pay-as-you-go to a funded system.  The 
outgoing Conservative government in the United Kingdom proposed such a 
scheme in 1997.35  Croatia has also adopted the pre-paid expenditure tax.  
Secondly, it limits tax avoidance and evasion by ensuring the government 
collects the money up-front.  It also ensures revenues can be collected from 
foreign workers or people who intend to emigrate on retirement.  Thirdly, it will 
raise more revenues from people who are higher-rate taxpayers during their 
working life but pay tax at the standard rate during retirement.36   
 However, the pre-paid expenditure tax has two major drawbacks.  First, 
although the tax incentive may be equivalent to a classical expenditure tax, 
psychology suggests that the up-front tax relief is perceived as more valuable.  
Financial-services companies also find up-front reliefs a better selling point.37  
Secondly, the pre-paid expenditure tax subjects funded pensions to ‘policy 
risk’.  A future government may not feel bound by commitments of previous 
governments not to tax pensions in payment or investment returns, and may 
view pension funds as an easy revenue target.  This is likely to undermine the 
attractiveness of funded pensions to potential investors.   
 
9. Conclusions 
 The expenditure-tax system taxes pensions once: either when contributions are 
made or when benefits are withdrawn.  It is the best way of taxing pensions, because 
it does not distort the decision whether to consume now or save and consume in the 
future, unlike the comprehensive income tax.  Moreover, it is also easy to administer 
and the tax burden does not vary arbitrarily with inflation.  A more generous 
treatment than the expenditure tax is not justified, neither by the impact on national 
saving nor the effect on public pension and social-assistance liabilities.   
                                       
35 This is the so-called ‘basic-pension-plus’ scheme.  See Whitehouse (1998), section VI, 
Department of Social Security (1997) and Whitehouse and Wolf (1997).    
36 The effect can be seen by comparing the first and fourth columns in Table 6.  The TEE 
treatment would still produce a net pension of 96.63 if the taxpayer were a higher-rate 
taxpayer while in work and standard-rate taxpayer in retirement.   
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 Most countries tax pensions using a system close to the expenditure tax.  The 
pre-paid version of the tax, which exempts benefits, collects more revenue up-front.  
However, it may not be credible if consumers suspect the government might 
eventually tax benefits when they are paid.  Finally, in the context of the design and 
implementation of a pension reform, it is important to take the cost of tax reliefs, 
measured by tax expenditures, into account.   
                                                                                                                           
37 See Thaler (1994).   
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